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Eleven experiments provide evidence that people have a tendency to ‘shoot the 
messenger,’ deeming innocent bearers of bad news unlikeable. In a pre-registered lab 
experiment, participants rated messengers who delivered bad news from a random drawing as 
relatively unlikeable (Study 1). A second set of studies points to the specificity of the effect: 
Study 2A shows that it is unique to the (innocent) messenger, and not mere bystanders. Study 2B 
shows that it is distinct from merely receiving information that one disagrees with. We suggest 
that people’s tendency to deem bearers of bad news as unlikeable stems in part from their desire 
to make sense of chance processes. Consistent with this account, receiving bad news activates 
the desire to sense-make (Study 3A), and in turn, activating this desire enhances the tendency to 
dislike bearers of bad news (Study 3B). Next, stemming from the idea that unexpected outcomes 
heighten the desire to sense-make, Study 4 shows that when bad news is unexpected, messenger 
dislike is pronounced. Finally, consistent with the notion that people fulfill the desire to sense-
make by attributing agency to entities adjacent to chance events, messenger dislike is correlated 
with the belief that the messenger had malevolent motives (Studies 5A, 5B, & 5C). Studies 6A & 
6B go further, manipulating messenger motives independently from news valence to suggest its 
causal role in our process account: the tendency to dislike bearers of bad news is mitigated when 
recipients are made aware of the benevolence of the messenger’s motives. 
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Shooting the Messenger 
Hence, horrible villain, or I’ll spurn thine eyes 
Like balls before me! I’ll unhair thy head! 
 
In Shakespeare’s Antony and Cleopatra, Cleopatra has harsh words for the messenger 
who conveys the unwelcome news that Antony has married another. If Cleopatra’s response is 
any guide, messengers are the targets of unwarranted nastiness. Indeed, history is replete with 
situations in which those who dutifully deliver bad news face devastating consequences. From 
ancient pharaohs to Alexander the Great, some of history’s greatest rulers are infamous for 
killing those who brought unwelcome news. In each of these cases, the messenger was just that: 
a person charged with merely communicating information, notably with no role in causing the 
unfortunate event to occur in the first place. 
Beyond historical anecdotes, in modern daily life, examples abound of situations in 
which people receive unwanted news from an “innocent” messenger—someone who had no role 
in the unfortunate event’s occurrence. This situation is common in medical contexts for example, 
when a health care provider must tell a patient something upsetting: a positive test result, a less-
than-rosy prognosis, a brutal treatment regimen. How do patients respond in such situations? We 
provide evidence of a tendency to penalize innocent messengers and the psychology underlying 
it. 
Specifically, we show that innocent messengers who must convey an outcome undesired 
by the recipient are the targets of misplaced backlash in the form of diminished perceptions of 
likeability and benevolence. Importantly, we focus on outcomes, such as those determined at 
random, over which neither the messenger nor the recipient could have had substantive control. 




We posit that the tendency to derogate innocent bearers of bad news is undergirded in part by 
people’s fundamental need for, and desire to make sense of events that happen to them, even 
those arising from chance. Specifically, we propose that receiving news of an unwanted outcome 
heightens the desire to sense-make, which people fulfill by erroneously ascribing agency to 
innocent messengers. The result? Bearers of bad news are deemed to have malevolent motives, 
breeding dislike. 
Related Research 
Related work on performance feedback suggests that people sometimes judge evaluators 
negatively when receiving a bad review (Bannister, 1986; Blakely, 1993; Kingsley Westerman, 
Reno, & Heuett, 2015), especially when it disconfirms their self-concept (Green, Gino, & Staats, 
2017). But in such situations, the generation and delivery of the news are intertwined: judging a 
messenger harshly in this context could be defensible. One might reasonably worry that the 
evaluator lacks skill in conducting performance evaluations, has biased views, or is driven by 
underhanded motives. Such inferences may be particularly warranted in situations in which the 
messenger may be plausibly assumed to have opted into the role, especially given that people 
tend to avoid having to convey bad news when given the choice (Rosen & Tesser, 1970). 
In contrast, we explore situations in which messengers are assigned their fate, have no 
substantive control over the unfortunate event’s occurrence, and this independence is transparent 
to recipients. As such, our work builds on prior research on impressions of mere communicators, 
which shows that people’s perceptions of communicators are affected by the content of the 
messages those communicators convey, even when that content has nothing to do with the 
communicator (e.g., Gawronski & Walther, 2008; Manis, Cornell, & Moore, 1974; Skowronski, 
Carlston, Mae, & Crawford, 1998). For example, Spontaneous Trait Transference refers to 




observers’ erroneous belief that communicators who merely describe someone else’s traits 
possess those traits themselves (Carlston, Skowronski, & Sparks, 1995; Skowronski et al., 1998). 
Like this prior work, we study inferences drawn from communicators that lack a logical basis. 
In this previous research, however, perceivers are third parties who witness the 
communicator describe someone (Gawronski & Walther, 2008; Skowronski et al., 1998) or 
convey a stance (Manis et al., 1974). In contrast, we study perceivers who are directly 
implicated: those who receive news of an undesired or desired outcome conveyed directly to 
them by a messenger. Of this prior work, the present research is perhaps most closely related to a 
finding from Manis et al. (1974, Study 2) suggesting that the tendency to like people with whose 
beliefs we agree (Byrne, 1969; Griffit & Veitch, 1971) extends to those who merely 
communicate such beliefs – regardless of whether the communicator personally endorses those 
beliefs. Specifically, in this study, pro-marijuana perceivers held a messenger conveying a 
message with which they agreed (that marijuana should be legalized) in higher regard than 
messengers conveying disagreed-with or neutral messages. Whereas in the Manis et al. (1974) 
study, the unwelcome information is counter-attitudinal information – such that the ratings of the 
messenger may be related to a social cognitive process of perceived dissimilarity – in our 
paradigms there is no attitudinal similarity information; instead, messengers communicate an 
undesired outcome determined at random. Further attesting to the uniqueness of our research, we 
suggest that these conceptual differences between the previous research and ours are undergirded 
by distinct processes – with the shooting the messenger effect driven in part by a unique sense-
making mechanism, which we develop in the next section. 
Shooting the Messenger: Conceptual Account 




Why might people denigrate a messenger who, through no fault of their own, must relay 
news of unwanted outcomes? We posit that this tendency is motivational in nature, stemming 
from people’s need to understand and make sense of events that happen to them (Janoff-Bulman, 
1992; Janoff-Bulman & Frantz, 1997; Park & Folkman, 1997). Sense-making – making 
connections among things, events, and relationships (Baumeister, 1991) – is posited to be a 
central psychological activity; it has been invoked in theories across many areas of psychology, 
including clinical psychology (Hayes, Laurenceau, Feldman, Strauss, & Cardaciotto, 2007), 
health psychology (White, 2004), and cross-cultural psychology (e.g., Mendoza-Denton & 
Hansen, 2007.) 
What activates people’s desire to sense-make? Perhaps most fundamentally, it is believed 
to be activated in situations in which people’s sense of global meaning is violated. Global 
meaning refers to people’s “general orienting systems” (Antonovsky, 1987; Epstein, 1991; 
Horowitz, 1991; Janoff-Bulman & Frantz, 1997; Marris, 1986; Mischel & Morf, 2003; Park, 
2010) – the lenses through which people perceive, interpret, and comprehend the world. 
Although there are individual differences in global beliefs (Janoff-Bulman, 1992), commonly 
held beliefs are that the world is just (Lerner, 1970, 1980); benevolent (Catlin & Epstein, 1992; 
Janoff- Bulman, 1989; Taylor & Brown, 1988, 1994; Wortman & Silver, 1992); predictable, 
coherent, and controllable (Janoff-Bulman, 1989; Janoff-Bulman & Frieze, 1983; Wortman, 
1983). Experiencing an event that seems to violate these beliefs – for example, a diagnosis of a 
disease with no apparent cause – is distressing (Carver & Scheier, 1998; Dalgleish, 2004; 
Epstein, 1991; Festinger, 1957; Horowitz, 1975; Janoff-Bulman & Frieze, 1983; Tait & Silver, 
1989; Watkins, 2008). In turn, this incongruence motivates people to make sense of the event; 
doing so is theorized to help resolve the discomfort people feel when their experiences are 




inconsistent with their global beliefs (Cooper, 2007; Festinger, 1957; Plaks, Grant, & Dweck, 
2005).1 For example, unexpected events – perhaps because they violate a commonly-held belief 
that the world is coherent and predictable – seem to activate the desire to sense-make (Bettman 
& Weitz, 1983; Clary & Tessler, 1983; Heine, Proulx, & Vohs, 2006; Kanazawa, 1992; 
Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 1981; Weiner, 1985; Wong & Weiner, 1981). Accordingly, the desire 
to sense-make appears to be particularly strong for parents of children who have died 
unexpectedly (Davis, Wortman, Lehman, & Christopher, 2000). Of particular relevance to the 
posited shooting the messenger phenomenon, prior work suggests that the desire to sense-make 
is activated for negative outcomes and outcomes arising from chance.  
Negatively-valenced outcomes – perhaps because they violate a commonly-held belief 
that the world is benevolent – seem to activate the desire to sense-make. Consistent with this 
proposition, people are particularly inclined to seek explanations for negative events 
(Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001; Rozin & Royzman, 2001; Skowronski & 
Carlston, 1989). For example, people facing trauma, such as the death of a partner, frequently 
report attempts to make sense of those events (Nolen-Hoeksema, McBride, & Larson, 1997). 
Consistent with these findings, sense-making is central to many models of adaptation to stressful 
life events (Bonanno & Kaltman, 1999; Davis et al., 2000; Janoff-Bulman, 1992; Joseph & 
Linley, 2005; Lepore & Helgeson, 1998; Neimeyer, 2001; Taylor, 1983; Thompson & Janigian, 
1988). These models imply that coming up with an explanation for the event – the outcome of 
sense-making processes – promotes psychological recovery in the wake of trauma. 
                                                          
1 Beliefs about specific events are typically more malleable than global belief systems, so sense-making attempts are 
posited to focus on assimilating the specific event into one’s global belief system (Epstein, 1980; Fiske & Taylor, 
1991; Janoff-Bulman, 1989; Janoff-Bulman, 1992; Janoff-Bulman & Timko, 1987; Marris, 1986; Nisbett & Ross, 
1980; Patterson, 1993; Singer & Salovey, 1991), as opposed to vice versa, though there is scholarly debate on this 
point (Joseph & Linley, 2005; Park, 2010; Wrosch, Scheier, Carver, & Schulz, 2003). 




Chance events – perhaps because they violate commonly-held beliefs that the world is 
predictable and controllable – also seem to activate the desire to sense-make, implying that 
people are motivated to seek explanations for events that are inherently inexplicable. Indeed 
people sometimes come up with (erroneous) elaborate explanations for chance events (Keinan, 
1994; Risen, 2016). Relatedly, people are particularly prone to “illusory pattern perception” – to 
see patterns where none exist – when they lack control (Whitson & Galinsky, 2008). 
Once the desire to sense-make has been activated, how do people go about fulfilling it? 
Theorists have proposed that people fulfill this desire by generating explanations, or ostensible 
causes, for outcomes (Janoff-Bulman & Frantz, 1997; Thompson & Janigian, 1988); and they 
appear to do so quite readily (Bulman & Wortman, 1977; Heider, 1944; Michotte, 1963). 
Negative outcomes in particular, in addition to activating the desire to sense-make, seem to 
facilitate causal reasoning (Bohner, Bless, Schwarz, & Strack, 1988; Gilovich, 1983; Lau, 1984; 
Staton, 1984). For example, people generate more causal explanations when listing their 
thoughts after failing, as opposed to passing, a test. Similarly, people are especially prone to 
attributing agency to others for negative outcomes: in the ultimatum game for example, people 
are more likely to believe their partners to be human when offered unfavorable divisions than 
when offered favorable ones (Morewedge, 2009). Consistent with this research, people are more 
likely to be held responsible for negative side-effects of their (intentional) actions than for 
positive side-effects (Knobe, 2003, 2005). 
One’s ability to generate causal explanations and to implicate others in those explanations 
is facilitated by certain contextual features (Kahneman, 2011; Kunda, 1990; Risen, 2016). For 
example, it is enhanced when the surface features of causality are present, such as co-occurrence 
and proximity. Rightly or wrongly, people attribute agency to those proximal to the event 




(Baumeister, 1991; Frankl, 1963; Heider, 1958; Kanazawa, 1992; Kelley, 1973; McArthur, 1972; 
Ross, 1977; Taylor, 1983; Park & Cohen, 1992). These contextual features are also relevant to 
the phenomenon of interest: relative to others merely present when information is conveyed, 
messengers are more closely connected, if only in a superficial sense, to the bad news. As a 
result, bad news messengers may be prime candidates in recipients’ search for protagonists to 
cast in their accounts of unwanted outcomes. 
Undergirded by this conceptual account, we posit a “shooting the messenger” effect, 
namely, that innocent bearers of bad news will be disliked (Studies 1-6). Although such 
messengers could be the targets of other unwarrantedly negative judgments (e.g., incompetence, 
untrustworthiness, etc.), we focus on likeability, as dislike has been found to dominate judgments 
of other attributes (e.g., competence) in driving individuals’ behaviors towards a target (Casciaro 
& Lobo, 2008). 
This conceptual account also points to a psychological process underlying the posited 
effect. If people are motivated to make sense of negative outcomes, especially those arising 
outside of their control, then receiving bad news should increase people’s desire to sense-make 
(Study 3A). In turn, we predict that the desire to sense-make breeds dislike of bearers of bad 
news (Study 3B, Study 4). Why? Because people make sense of the unwanted outcome by 
(erroneously) attributing agency to the messenger. As a result, we posit that recipients will 
perceive such messengers as having malevolent motives – that they hoped for, or even tried to 
cause, the undesired outcome (Studies 5A-5C). In turn, we posit that believing the bad news 
messenger to have malevolent motives causes recipients to dislike that messenger (Studies 6A & 
6B). 




We posit this psychological process to contribute to the proposed “shooting the 
messenger” effect, but we do not contend it to be the sole underlying driver. In situating our 
process account within the broader literature, we consider two related yet distinct dimensions on 
which many psychological processes vary: associative-propositional and automatic-controlled. 
Associative processes are characterized by affective reactions produced by co-occurrence of 
stimuli, whereas propositional processes are characterized by evaluative judgments based on 
syllogistic inferences (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006). Our account invokes both motivated 
causal reasoning and attributions – hallmarks of propositional accounts – thus, we posit 
propositional processes to play a role in the tendency to dislike innocent bearers of bad news. In 
invoking propositional processes, our process account is thus conceptually distinct from the 
associative process posited to underlie Manis et al.’s Study 2 (1974, p. 87) and documented to 
underlie Spontaneous Trait Transference and related phenomena (Carlston & Skowronski, 2005; 
Manis et al., 1974; Molet, Stagner, Miller, Kosinski, & Zentall, 2013; Orghian, Garcia-Marques, 
Uleman, & Heinke, 2015; Skowronski et al., 1998; Wells, Skowronski, Crawford, Scherer, & 
Carlston, 2011). This is not to say that associative processes are necessarily inactive in the 
phenomenon we document; our contention is that propositional processes play a role. 
On the automatic-controlled dimension, automatic processes are characterized by 
shallow, unconscious thought, whereas controlled processes are characterized by deeper, more 
elaborate and effortful mental activity (Bargh, 1994; Evans, 2008; Ferreira, Garcia-Marques, & 
Sherman, 2006). Although deliberation can be implicated in attributional processes (and 
automaticity in associative processes), it need not be (Carlston & Skowronski, 2005; Gawronski 
& Bodenhausen, 2006). Indeed, research suggests that causal explanations, even fallacious ones, 
are sometimes generated effortlessly, seemingly automatically (Hastie, 1984; Sloman, 2014; 




Weiner, 1985). This duality is reflected in research on the relationship between cognitive effort 
(a hallmark of controlled processes) and motivated reasoning phenomena. While some research 
suggests that when people are motivated to interpret information in a certain way (e.g., to bolster 
their political beliefs), they engage in more cognitive effort to do so relative to when such 
motivation is dampened (Ditto & Lopez, 1992; Kahan, 2013; Petersen, Skov, Serritzlew, & 
Ramsøy, 2013; Redlawsk, 2002), other work suggests the opposite (e.g., Balcetis & Dunning, 
2006; Bruner & Goodman, 1947; Wong & Weiner, 1981); for example, Callan, Sutton, & 
Dovale (2010) found motivated causal attribution to be enhanced under high cognitive load. 
These conflicting results make it unclear whether our proposed motivational sense-making 
account should be mentally effortful or not. And indeed according to a comprehensive review 
(Park, 2010), sense-making processes have been inconclusive on this distinction; both automatic 
and controlled processes have been invoked to explain meaning-making phenomena (Boehmer, 
Luszczynska, & Schwarzer, 2007; Creamer, Burgess, & Pattison, 1992; Folkman, 1997; Gray, 
Maguen, & Litz, 2007; Horowitz, 1986; McIntosh, Silver, & Wortman, 1993; Moulds & Bryant, 
2004; Smith, Haynes, Lazarus, & Pope, 1993).  
Therefore, in ascertaining the distinctiveness of our account, we focus on the former, 
propositional-associative distinction, testing whether our process account holds when controlling 
for a complementary, associative process account. Specifically, we test whether the belief that 
the messenger’s motives are malevolent is correlated with dislike of that messenger (Studies 5A, 
5B, & 5C), and whether this correlation holds when controlling for an associative process 
measure (Study 5B). In Study 4, we test whether our effect is moderated by a motivational factor 
invoked specifically by propositional accounts: consistency, or the notion that when people 




encounter inconsistent information, they turn to propositional reasoning processes to resolve that 
inconsistency (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006). 
Overview of Studies 
Eleven experiments provide support for our hypotheses. Study 1 is a preregistered 
experiment (https://osf.io/yccbj/) documenting the basic effect. A second set of studies points to 
the specificity of the effect: Study 2A shows that it is unique to the (innocent) messenger, and 
not mere bystanders. Study 2B shows that it is distinct from merely receiving information that 
one disagrees with. Then, in four sets of studies that use complementary methods, we provide 
evidence consistent with the sense-making attributional process posited to underlie the effect. 
First, we show that receiving bad news activates the desire to sense-make (Study 3A), and that, 
in turn, activating the desire to sense-make enhances the tendency to dislike bearers of bad news 
(Study 3B). Next, stemming from the idea that the desire to sense-make is heightened for 
unexpected outcomes, Study 4 shows that the dislike of bearers of bad news is pronounced when 
that bad news is unexpected. Consistent with the notion that people fulfill the desire to sense-
make by attributing agency to entities adjacent chance events, we then show that messenger 
dislike is correlated with the belief that the messenger had malevolent motives (Studies 5A, 5B, 
& 5C). Studies 6A & 6B go further, manipulating messenger motives independently from news 
valence to suggest its causal role in our process account: the tendency to dislike bearers of bad 
news is mitigated when recipients are made aware of the benevolence of the messenger’s 
motives. 
In online studies in which data collection is quick and inexpensive, we targeted a 
minimum sample size of 75 participants per between-subjects condition, consistent with recent 
thinking on appropriate sample sizes (Simmons, 2014). We pre-specified our sample sizes based 




on this guidance rather than on predicted effect sizes because each of our studies considered a 
different aspect of the phenomenon, limiting our potential to confidently estimate a priori effect 
size. In the lab experiment (Study 1), we sought to collect as much data as we could in three days 
of sessions. We disclose all manipulations and measures. The authors’ Institutional Review 
Board approved all studies. No data were excluded unless otherwise indicated. Attrition rates 
were low (never above 6%) and did not differ by experimental condition. Data and stimuli are 
here: https://osf.io/yccbj/  
 
Study 1: Basic Effect 
Study 1 assesses people’s (dis)like of messengers who, through no fault of their own, 
deliver either good or bad news. The study was a two condition between-subjects design 
manipulating the valence of the news (good vs. bad). 
Method 
 This study was the first of a series of unrelated studies run in 90-minute lab sessions of 
20–36 people during which each participant was seated at their own private cubicle. Participants 
(N = 241, 49% male, Mage = 30.8 years, SD = 12.1) received $25 for the session, plus the 
potential for a $2 bonus. The experiment had two conditions: one in which a bonus was earned 
(good news condition) and one in which a bonus was not earned (bad news condition). 
Participants were told that they would be participating in a random number drawing in which 
they could earn a $2 bonus. First, the following information appeared on each participant’s 
computer monitor: 
On the next screen, you will be asked to select a number from 1 to 10. 
After you do this, a researcher will draw a number from 1 to 10 from a 
hat. If the researcher draws an even number, AND you chose an even 




number, then you will earn a $2 bonus. But if you choose an odd number 
in this case you will NOT earn a $2 bonus. Similarly if the researcher 
draws an odd number, AND you chose an odd number, then you will 
earn a $2 bonus. But if you chose an even number in this case, then you 
will NOT earn a $2 bonus. 
Once all participants had entered a number into the computer, their attention was turned 
to the front of the room, where two research assistants stood. In plain sight of all participants, 
one of the research assistants pulled a slip of paper from a hat and, without reading the slip, 
immediately and saliently handed it over to the other research assistant, who served as the 
messenger. The research assistant who pulled the slip of paper from the hat did not read the slip 
to ensure that participants learned the news directly from the messenger. The messenger research 
assistant opened the slip of paper and announced the following, which was tailored according to 
whether an odd versus even number was drawn: 
If you wrote down an even [odd] number, then I have bad news for you: 
you did not win the $2 bonus because an odd-numbered [even-
numbered] slip was drawn. If you wrote down an odd [even] number, 
then I have good news for you: you won the $2 bonus because an odd-
numbered [even-numbered] slip was drawn. [Messenger holds up slip of 
paper with printed number visible]. Please proceed with the online 
survey – we have a few questions for you about this experience. Please 
enter the code abc to continue. 
Thus the number drawing served as our method of randomizing participants to receive 
either good or bad news. The two research assistants and their roles were held constant across 
sessions. 




Next, participants indicated whether the research assistant had drawn an even or an odd 
number. They were then directed to a page that said: “we are interested in your impression of the 
researcher that broke the good [bad] news that you won [did not win] the $2 bonus,” followed by 
a page on which they responded to the item: “The researcher who announced what number was 
drawn is likeable,” on a 10-point scale with endpoints labelled “Not at all” and “Extremely” (c.f., 
Brooks, Gino, & Schweitzer, 2015). This and all studies concluded with basic demographic 
questions. 
Results 
Participants’ number choices ranged from 1 to 10 (M = 5.48, SD = 2.44, Median = 6, 
Mode = 7). Random assignment worked: 48% of participants won the bonus (NS from 50%), and 
hence received good news; the rest received bad news. 
Liking. As hypothesized, the messenger was judged to be significantly less likeable when 
delivering bad news relative to good news (Mbad = 6.26, SD = 2.34; Mgood = 7.21, SD = 2.08), 
t(239) = 3.32, p = .001, d = 0.43, BF10 = 23.81. 
 In sum, Study 1 provides evidence that people derogate messengers of bad news, even 
when such messengers clearly have had no hand in the unfortunate event’s occurrence. 
 
Studies 2A and 2B: Specificity of Effect  
Studies 2A and 2B test the specificity of the effect. Study 2A tests whether it is specific 
to the (innocent) messenger, and not mere bystanders. In addition, Study 2A moves beyond the 
rarefied number drawing set-up from Study 1 to demonstrate the basic effect in a more 
contextually rich scenario. Study 2B tests whether the effect is distinct from receiving counter-
attitudinal information (i.e., a message that recipients disagree with). 





Study 2A was a 2 (News Valence: good vs. bad; between-subjects) x 2 (Rating Target: 
messenger vs. bystander; within-subjects) mixed design. 
Method 
Prospective participants (N = 328 people from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk; hereafter 
referred to as “MTurk workers”) were first asked “Have you or an immediate family member of 
yours ever been diagnosed with cancer?” those answering “Yes” were screened out per IRB 
requirement. Those answering “No” (N = 150, 56% male, Mage = 33.4 years, SD = 10.9) 
imagined themselves as patients attending a medical appointment to learn whether a recent 
biopsy had tested positive for skin cancer. This scenario was developed to provide relevant yet 
minimally threatening medical information as most patients perceive skin cancer as non-life 
threatening (Rutten, Hesse, Moser, McCaul, & Rothman, 2009). The scenario invoked two 
nurses: one of the nurses was an innocent messenger who delivered the test result; the other 
nurse was an innocent bystander who was simply handling the appointment calendar that day. 
Specifically, participants were told: 
One week ago, you received a biopsy to test for skin cancer. The results are now in, 
so you are called into your medical clinic. Your nurse, Nurse Johnson, tells you: “I 
have bad [good] news: your biopsy tested positive [negative]. This means that the 
mole is [NOT] cancerous. When you leave please schedule a routine follow-up 
appointment – just let Nurse Smith know on the way out. Nurse Smith is handling 
the scheduling today.” 
Next, for each nurse, participants rated the statement: “I like Nurse Smith [Johnson]” on a 
scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 9 (strongly agree), with the midpoint labelled “neither agree 




nor disagree.” Between-subjects, we counterbalanced both the ascription of nurse to role and the 
order in which the nurses were rated (order did not matter; the results collapse across this factor).  
Participants finished by completing an attention check in which they were tasked with 
identifying the test result from their scenario (98% passed; in this and all studies results hold 
when analyses are restricted to those who passed any administered checks) and indicating 
whether they had ever been tested for cancer (results hold when controlling for whether 
participants had ever been tested for cancer; 19% had). 
Results 
Liking. A two-way mixed analysis of variance (ANOVA) with news valence condition 
(good vs. bad) as the between-subjects factor and target (messenger vs. bystander) as the within-
subjects factor revealed a main effect and an interaction. There was a main effect of news 
valence: likeability was lower in the bad news condition (Mbad = 5.15, SDbad = 1.59) relative to 
the good news condition (Mgood = 6.19, SDgood = 1.43), F(1, 148) = 23.14, p < .001, η2 = .14. 
Critically however, an interaction revealed that this main effect was driven entirely by judgments 
of the messenger F(1, 148) = 41.61, p < .001, η2 = .22 (Figure 1). Specifically, as predicted, the 
messenger was liked less when she broke bad news (Mbad = 4.87, SDbad = 1.82) relative to when 
she broke good news (Mgood = 6.61, SDgood = 1.42), t(148) = 6.51, p < .001, d = 1.06, BF10 = 
8178797. By contrast, ratings of the scheduler nurse were insensitive to news valence—they 
were similar regardless of whether good (Mgood = 5.77, SDgood = 1.33) versus bad news (Mbad = 
5.43, SDbad = 1.28) had been conveyed, t(148) = 1.58, p = .12, d = 0.26, BF01 = 1.82. 
In sum, study 2A demonstrates the specificity of the effect: dislike is directed at innocent 
messengers of bad news, and not innocent bystanders. That bystander perceptions were 
unaffected is also broadly consistent with previous work showing the distinctiveness of 




perceptions of communicators versus those merely present while information is being conveyed 
(Crawford, Skowronski, & Stiff, 2007; Crawford, Skowronski, Stiff, & Scherer, 2007). 
 
Study 2B 
Study 2B provides further evidence of effect specificity by showing that it is distinct from 
merely receiving information with which one disagrees. Participants’ bonus payment was tied to 
one of two possible statements a researcher had been given to read aloud. Between-subjects, we 
manipulated two factors: 1. whether the statement advocated for versus against marijuana 
legalization; hence the messenger conveyed something that was either consistent with, or 
inconsistent with, participants’ attitudes; and 2. the ascription of news valence to statement: the 
bonus was given either when the attitude-consistent statement was read, or when the attitude-
inconsistent statement was read. Study 2B was therefore a 2 (Attitude Consistency: consistent vs. 
inconsistent) x 2 (News Valence: good vs. bad) between-subjects design. We predicted the effect 
of news valence on messenger likeability to hold both among participants receiving the attitude-
consistent statement, as well as among those receiving the attitude-inconsistent statement.  
In the studies so far, we did not explicitly convey to participants that the messenger was 
assigned the role (and therefore did not choose to convey the bad news). As a result, and 
especially considering that in everyday life messengers sometimes have the choice to speak up or 
stay quiet, participants may have inferred our messenger to have opted into the role. And, for 
messengers assumed to have chosen their fate, it could be reasonable to question why they did 
so, and whether it is indicative of bad motives: is the messenger breaking bad news because he 
benefits in some way from others’ misery? Thus to the extent participants believed the 
messenger to have chosen the role, it could be reasonable for them to dislike that messenger. 




Study 2B (and later Study 5C) addresses this issue by explicitly conveying that the messenger 
was assigned, as opposed to had chosen, his fate, and includes comprehension checks to ensure 
participants noticed this fact. 
Method 
First, prospective participants (N = 580 MTurk workers) indicated whether they were 
“pro marijuana legalization,” “anti-marijuana legalization,” or “neutral/undecided” (c.f., Manis 
et al., 1974). Those who selected “neutral/undecided” (n = 71, 12% of 580) were screened out; 
those remaining (N = 509; 59% male, Mage = 34.3 years, SD = 9.7) received $0.50 and the chance 
to win a $0.10 bonus. 
Next, participants were told: 
You have already indicated whether you are generally in favor of or opposed to marijuana 
legalization. Next, a research assistant will read a statement that her boss gave her to read. The 
statement will be either pro legalization or anti legalization. If the opinion in the statement 
matches your own opinion about the legalization of marijuana (for or against), you will [will 
NOT] earn an additional $0.10. If the opinion in the statement does NOT match your own opinion 
about the legalization of marijuana (for or against), you will NOT [will] earn an additional $0.10. 
On the following page, participants watched a video in which the research assistant read the 
statement, which was tailored based on whether the participant was pro or against marijuana 
legalization. In the video, the researcher started by saying:  
“Hello. My boss gave me this envelope with a statement inside to open and read. The statement 
inside will either be pro marijuana legalization, or anti marijuana legalization.”  
Next, the video depicted the research assistant opening the envelope, looking at the paper inside, 
and saying: 




“I have good [bad] news for you. My boss gave me a pro [anti] statement to read. That means 
you earned [did not earn] the $0.10 bonus. Here’s the summary…”  
Then, the research assistant read aloud the statement on the paper (which was either a pro-
legalization or anti-legalization; Appendix A).  
Next, participants rated the item “the researcher who read the statement is likeable” on a 
scale from 1 (not at all) to 10 (extremely). Participants then completed three comprehension 
checks in which they were tasked with identifying whether: 1) the researcher had asked to break 
the news versus was assigned to break it (92% passed); 2) the statement was consistent versus 
inconsistent with the participant’s attitudes (92% passed); and 3) they earned the bonus (i.e., 
whether they had received good versus bad news) (97% passed). 
Results 
Liking. A two-way ANOVA with attitude consistency (consistent vs. inconsistent) and 
news valence (good vs. bad) as between-subjects factors revealed two main effects. First, 
replicating Manis et al. (1974), there was a main effect of attitude consistency: messengers 
conveying information inconsistent with recipients’ attitudes were deemed less likeable relative 
to those conveying attitude-consistent information (Minconsistent = 6.81, SDinconsistent = 2.21; 
Mconsistent = 7.38, SDconsistent = 1.87), F(1, 505) = 10.65, p = .001, η2 = .02. Importantly however, 
there was also a main effect of news valence: independent from whether messengers conveyed 
attitude-consistent versus inconsistent information, messengers were deemed less likeable when 
they conveyed bad news relative to when they conveyed good news (Mbad = 6.55, SDbad = 2.06; 
Mgood = 7.63, SDgood = 1.91), F(1, 505) = 38.12, p < .001, η2 = .07. Put differently, the tendency 
to dislike bearers of bad news held both when the participant received an attitude-consistent 
message (Mbad consistent = 6.97, SDbad consistent = 1.87; Mgood consistent = 7.80, SDgood consistent = 1.79), 
t(249) = 3.62, p < .001, d = 0.45, BF10 = 61.28, as well as an attitude-inconsistent message (Mbad 




inconsistent = 6.14, SDbad inconsistent = 2.19; Mgood inconsistent = 7.48, SDgood inconsistent = 2.02), t(254) = 
5.08, p < .001, d = 0.63, BF10 = 18025.09. There was no interaction F(1, 505) = 2.17, p = .14, η2 
< .01. 
In sum, Study 2B demonstrates that people’s dislike of bearers of bad news is distinct 
from receiving counter-attitudinal information. 
 
Studies 3A and 3B 
The Role of Sense-Making: Causal Chain Approach 
Studies 1 and 2 demonstrate that innocent messengers of bad news are disliked. We have 
posited that underlying this effect is a desire to make sense of unwanted outcomes. Studies 3A 
and 3B test this proposition using a “causal chain” approach (Spencer, Zanna, & Fong, 2005). 
Specifically, Study 3A tests whether receiving bad news increases people’s desire to sense-make. 
Next, Study 3B tests whether heightening the desire to sense-make makes people particularly 
likely to dislike (innocent) messengers of bad news. 
Study 3A 
 Study 3A was a two condition between-subjects design in which we manipulated news 
valence (bad vs. control) and measured the extent to which participants sought to make sense of 
that news. Researchers have measured sense-making in a variety of different ways (see Park, 
2010 for a summary). One common approach, which we also adopt here, is to ask people 
directly. 
Method 




 Participants (N = 198 MTurk workers; 46.8% male, Mage = 34.6 years, SD = 11.7) were 
asked to imagine a plane-boarding scenario, whereby they were “at the airport, sitting at gate B5, 
which is the gate for your flight.” Participants in the bad news condition were told:  
The gate agent makes the following announcement: This is an announcement that this flight is 
delayed by two hours: your flight will depart two hours later than scheduled.”  
Participants in the control condition were told: 
The gate agent makes the following announcement: “This is an announcement that this flight has 
had a gate change: your flight will depart from gate B6 – one gate over from gate B5.” 
Thus, although the gate agent gave no explanation for the news in both conditions, we expected 
the desire to explain the news – that is, to sense-make – would be stronger in the bad news 
condition. (In a conceptual replication of this study reported in Appendix B, we used a different 
control condition – one in which the flight was to begin boarding in five minutes. The result 
replicated those described below). 
 Next, we measured sense-making by asking participants to rate the statement: “I am 
trying to make sense of this news” on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) 
(c.f., Bonanno, Wortman, & Nesse, 2004; Eton, Lepore, & Helgeson, 2005; Kernan & Lepore, 
2009; Tomich & Helgeson, 2002; Updegraff, Silver, & Holman, 2008). Finally, participants 
completed a multiple choice comprehension check in which they identified what the gate agent 
had announced (95% passed). Participants also indicated whether they had flown on a 
commercial airplane (93% had). 
Results 
Sense-making. Participants in the bad news condition were more likely to indicate that 
they were trying to make sense of the news relative to those in the control condition (Mbad = 4.58, 
SDbad = 1.80; Mcontrol = 4.03, SDcontrol = 1.77), t(196) = 2.17, p = .031, d = 0.31, BF10 = 1.38. 




In sum, Study 3A provides evidence of the first step of our process account, namely, that 
bad (versus neutral) news prompts people to try to make sense of it. 
 
Study 3B 
Study 3B uses a similar plane-boarding scenario as Study 3A. However, in Study 3B, all 
participants received bad news because we sought to test whether the desire to sense-make 
prompts people to dislike bearers of bad news. Thus, the study was a two condition between-
subjects design in which we manipulated the desire to sense-make (heightened vs. control). As in 
Study 3A, we turned to the sense-making literature for guidance in devising such a manipulation. 
This literature provides many exemplars and thus, much guidance, on how to measure sense-
making attempts; there is relatively scant guidance on how to manipulate the desire to sense-
make. Indeed, in a comprehensive review, Park (2010) acknowledged the need for prospective 
studies – studies exploring how exogenous changes in the desire to sense-make prompt sense-
making. Fortunately however, theorizing on the determinants of sense-making is well-developed. 
Thus in Study 3B we devised a sense-making manipulation by varying the extent to which the 
plane-boarding scenario featured three factors theorized to activate the desire to sense-make 
through violating the belief that the world is predictable, comprehensible, and just. As described 
below, we then pilot tested whether this manipulation was in fact modulating the desire to sense-
make, and not simply negative affect. 
Method 
Participants (N = 300 MTurk workers; 47.0% male, Mage = 36.5 years, SD = 11.9) were 
asked to imagine a plane-boarding scenario in which, as in Study 3A, they were “at the airport, 
sitting at gate B5, which is the gate for your flight.” All participants were given bad news: their 




flight was delayed substantially. For half of participants, we heightened the desire to sense-make 
by telling participants: 
Air traffic control has informed us that we have to give our departure slot to a different flight 
deemed to be higher priority. As a result, your flight is delayed by 3 hours. This other flight was 
initially scheduled to depart after your flight. 
We thought that having one’s departure slot co-opted by another flight, and for no apparent 
reason, would violate the commonly-held beliefs that the world is just, predictable, and 
comprehensible; and thus, that the desire to sense-make would be heightened in this scenario. In 
the control condition, participants were told:  
Air traffic control has informed us that there is bad weather. As a result, your flight is delayed by 
3 hours. All flights will be departing in the departure order as scheduled. 
Thus, although participants also faced a three hour delay, its rationale was less likely to induce 
the desire to sense-make; flights would take off in the pre-set order, consistent with the beliefs 
that the world is just, predictable, and comprehensible.  
Next, participants rated the statement: “The gate agent who made the announcement is 
likeable” on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 9 (strongly agree). Finally, participants 
completed a multiple choice comprehension check in which they identified what the gate agent 
had announced (96% passed). Participants also indicated whether they had flown on a 
commercial airplane (93% had). 
Manipulation Pilot. We conducted a pilot test to see whether our manipulation affected 
the desire to sense-make as intended. Pilot test participants (N = 301, 50.0% male, Mage = 36.4 
years, SD = 10.9) were shown the same stimuli as the main experiment; they were randomized to 
read either the control announcement or the announcement designed to heighten the desire to 
sense-make. We measured their desire to sense-make as in Study 3A. To test for the specificity 




of this manipulation – that it was inducing a desire to sense-make and not simply negative affect 
– we also administered the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 
1998). Between-subjects, we counter-balanced the order of administration of the two outcome 
measures (the results are robust to order; thus the results reported below collapse across this 
factor). 
Results indicated that in the sense-making condition, in which participants were given an 
unpredictable, seemingly unjust reason for the delay, participants expressed greater agreement 
with the item “I am trying to make sense of this delay” relative to participants in the control 
condition (Msense-make = 5.56, SDsense-make = 1.10; Mcontrol = 4.55, SDcontrol = 1.52), t(299) = 6.60, p 
< .001, d = 0.76, BF10 = 44254586). There was no significant difference between conditions in 
negative affect (PANAS negative affect scores: Msense-make = 18.99, SDsense-make = 7.98; Mcontrol = 
17.77, SDcontrol = 7.72), t(299) = 1.35, p = .18, d = 0.16, BF10 = 3.30. In addition, the difference 
in sense-making held when controlling for negative affect, F(1, 298) = 41.98, p < .001.  
 
Results 
Liking. Participants in the sense-making condition liked the gate agent less than those in 
the control condition (Msense-make = 4.55, SDsense-make = 1.19; Mcontrol = 4.23, SDcontrol = 1.22), 
t(298) = 2.51, p = .013, d = 0.28, BF10 = 2.522112.  
In sum, Studies 3A and 3B provide evidence of the role of sense-making in our account 
using a causal chain approach. Study 3A suggests that bad news activates the desire to sense-
make. Study 3B suggests that the desire to sense-make increases the tendency to derogate 
innocent bearers of bad news. Importantly however, this is not to say that the desire to sense-
make was necessarily inactive in the control condition of Study 3B; indeed, our account predicts 




that a three hour weather delay – a negative, uncontrollable event – might trigger a desire to 
sense-make, manifesting in messenger dislike. And, as we show in Study 4, when we simply 
give people bad news, without experimentally inducing the desire to sense-make, they exhibit 
greater dislike for the messenger relative to when they receive good news. However, consistent 
with our account, we show that this tendency is enhanced via a manipulation designed to 
heighten the desire to sense-make – i.e., when the bad news is unexpected. 
 
Study 4 
The Role of Sense-Making: Moderation 
Our account suggests that people are prone to derogating bearers of bad news in part 
because they are motivated to make sense of unwanted outcomes. Studies 3A and 3B provide 
some evidence of the role of sense-making in our account; Study 4 considers further evidence. 
Again, as in Study 3B, we sought to manipulate the desire to sense-make, and turned to previous 
research and theorizing to do so. Previous work suggests that people’s need for sense-making is 
heightened for unexpected outcomes (Bettman & Weitz, 1983; Clary & Tessler, 1983; 
Kanazawa, 1992; Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 1981; Weiner, 1985; Wong & Weiner, 1981). Thus, 
if the “shooting the messenger” effect is undergirded by a sense-making process, it should be 
pronounced when people receive unexpectedly bad news. Specifically, our account predicts that 
the tendency to derogate bearers of bad news will be heightened when the unwanted outcome is 
unexpected (i.e., when they expect good news but instead receive bad news). Study 4 tests this 
idea, operationalizing expectations in terms of the likelihood of the unwanted event’s occurrence 
(e.g., Lau & Russell, 1980). Specifically, in Study 4, using an instantiation of the medical 
scenario paradigm, we inform participants that there is either a relatively high or low likelihood 




of receiving bad news (i.e., of testing positive for skin cancer). The study was a 2 (News 
Valence: good vs. bad) x 2 (Bad News Expectation: bad news expected vs. bad news 
unexpected) between-subjects design. 
Method 
Prospective participants (N = 1,175 MTurk workers) were first asked “Have you or an 
immediate family member of yours ever been diagnosed with cancer?” those answering “Yes” 
were screened out per IRB requirement. Those answering “No” (N = 401) imagined themselves 
as patients attending a medical appointment to learn whether a recent biopsy had tested positive 
for skin cancer, as in Studies 2A and 3B. Between-subjects, we manipulated two factors: whether 
participants received good versus bad news, and whether bad news was expected versus 
unexpected. To manipulate expectations, we varied participants’ beliefs about the likely outcome 
of the biopsy. In the ‘bad news expected’ conditions, they were told: 
One week ago, you received a biopsy to test for skin cancer. When you received the biopsy, you 
were told that in cases similar to yours, the skin sample is usually found to be cancerous. So in 
other words imagine you were told that the biopsy you’re getting would likely reveal that you 
have cancer. 
In the ‘bad news unexpected’ conditions, they were told: 
One week ago, you received a biopsy to test for skin cancer. When you received the biopsy, you 
were told that in cases similar to yours, the skin sample is usually found to be NOT cancerous. So 
in other words imagine that you were told that even though you’re getting a biopsy, it’s very 
unlikely that you actually have cancer. 
In both cases, we incorporated empathy into the messenger’s script. Specifically, in the good 
news conditions, participants were told: 




Your doctor, Dr. Johnson, tells you: “I have good news: your biopsy tested negative. This means 
that the mole is NOT cancerous. I am so glad. I feel happy for you. It must be great to be the 
recipient of this news.” 
In the bad news conditions, participants were told: 
Your doctor, Dr. Johnson, tells you: “I have bad news: your biopsy tested positive. This means 
that the mole is cancerous. I am so sorry. I feel for you. It must be difficult to be the recipient of 
this news.” 
Next, participants rated the statement “I like Dr. Johnson” on a scale from 1 (strongly 
disagree) to 10 (strongly agree). 
Finally, participants completed two attention checks in which they were tasked with 
identifying the expectation that their biopsy would test positive for cancer (94% passed) and the 
test result from their scenario (98% passed), then indicated whether they had ever been tested for 
cancer (24% had), and completed some basic demographic information. 
Results 
Liking. Overall, bearers of bad news were liked less than bearers of good news, 
replicating our basic effect (Mbad = 6.05, SDbad = 2.36; Mgood = 7.70, SDgood = 2.46), F(1, 400) = 
47.39, p < .001, η2 = .11. There was no significant main effect of expectations on liking 
(MBadExpected = 6.88, SDBadExpected = 2.55; MBadUnexpected = 6.87, SDBadUnexpected = 2.56), F(1, 400) = 
0.03, p = .863, η2 < .01. Importantly, these effects were qualified by a significant News Valence 
x Expectations interaction, F(1, 400) = 5.71, p = .017, η2 = .013. Although participants derogated 
bad news messengers even when bad news was expected (Mbad = 6.35, SDbad = 2.31; Mgood = 
7.43, SDgood = 2.68; left side of Figure 2), t(199) = 3.06, p = .002, d = 0.43, BF10 = 11.51, the 
effect was stronger when bad news was unexpected (Mbad = 5.73, SDbad = 2.39; Mgood = 7.96, 
SDgood = 2.22; right side of Figure 2), t(198) = 6.82, p < .001, d = 0.96, BF10 = 74852802.  





Studies 5A, 5B, and 5C 
Ascription of Motives: Correlational Evidence 
Studies 3A, 3B, and 4 are consistent with our proposition that the desire to sense-make 
breeds dislike of messengers bearing bad news (Study 3B). Why might the desire to sense-make 
prompt people to dislike of bearers of bad news? We propose that people make sense of the 
unwanted outcome by (erroneously) attributing agency to the messenger. As a result, instead of 
perceiving bearers of bad news as innocent messengers, recipients might perceive them as having 
malevolent motives – that they hoped for, or even tried to cause, the undesired outcome. In turn, 
believing the bad news messenger to have malevolent motives could cause recipients to dislike 
that messenger. We test this idea in Studies 5A, 5B, and 5C. Specifically, we test whether 
messenger dislike is correlated with the belief that that messenger had malevolent motives.  
Study 5A 
Study 5A uses a number drawing paradigm as in Study 1 but also measures recipients’ 
perceptions of the messenger’s motives. Study 5A also includes a neutral news condition to test 
whether there is a specific effect of disliking bad news messengers (as opposed to merely liking 
bearers of good news). Study 5A was therefore a three condition between-subjects design in 
which we manipulated news valence (bad vs. neutral vs. good) and measured participants’ 
perceptions of the messenger’s motives and likeability. 
Method 
Participants (N = 304 MTurk workers; 48% male, Mage = 33.1 years, SD = 10.0) were 
guaranteed a $1 payment and endowed with an additional $0.10 for a draw. Participants were 
told that they would be asked to select between the numbers one, two, or three, and that one of 




these numbers would then be drawn at random. Further, they were told that if their selected 
number was drawn, they would earn an additional $0.10 (good news condition), and that if it was 
not drawn, they would either retain (neutral news condition) or lose (bad news condition) the 
$0.10 with which they had been endowed. Participants were then shown a table indicating the 
payoff for each of the nine possible combinations of participant-selected versus randomly drawn 
numbers (Appendix C). Prior to selecting a number, participants were required to correctly 
answer two quiz questions about the payment structure (Appendix D). 
After selecting a number, participants were shown a prerecorded video portraying a 
number drawing and a messenger conveying bad, neutral, or good news, depending on the 
combination of the participant-selected number and the randomly drawn number. The draw was 
not rigged; the number was drawn at random. To transparently convey the legitimacy of the 
drawing to participants, the video consisted of a single take in which a research assistant was 
shown displaying an empty bag, writing the numbers one, two, and three on slips of paper, 
putting them into the empty bag, drawing one out while looking away, and announcing the 
number the participant chose, the number drawn, and the resulting outcome (i.e., good, neutral, 
or bad). 
Given that the messenger referred to the number that the participant had selected and that 
we randomized whether the winning number was a one, two, or three, we created nine videos 
that were otherwise identical except for the numbers and the manipulation-specific information. 
We randomized the number drawing, and hence, the valence of the news, using the following 
procedure: after having selected their number, participants were shown three identical screen 
shots, each representing one of the three possible videos they could view, one in which a one was 
drawn, one in which a two was drawn, and one in which a three was drawn. For example, if a 




participant had selected the number one, she would then choose from three videos, in which the 
wining number was either a one (good news condition), two (neutral news condition), or three 
(bad news condition). Critically, because the screen shots were nearly identical, at the time of 
choosing a video, participants did not know which number would be drawn in the video they 
chose. This procedure thus served to both randomize the number drawn and to legitimize the 
draw (by letting participants choose one of the three videos, rather than imposing one on them).  
Next, participants rated the statement “I like the drawer” on a scale from 1 (strongly 
disagree) to 9 (strongly agree) and indicated their perceptions of the messenger’s motives by 
completing the statement “I think the drawer…” on a sliding scale from 1 (tried to draw the 
losing number) to 100 (tried to draw the winning number), with the midpoint labelled “was not 
trying to draw any number in particular.” The order of these measures was counterbalanced 
(order did not matter; we therefore collapse across it in the results). 
Results 
The randomization procedure produced roughly equivalent sample sizes between 
conditions (bad news condition: n = 102; neutral news condition: n = 100; good news condition: 
n = 102). 
Liking. Messenger liking differed by condition F(2, 301) = 40.64, p < .001, η2 = .21. 
Specifically, participants who received bad news (Mbad = 5.21, SDbad = 2.21) liked the drawer the 
least, followed by those who received neutral news (Mneutral = 6.46, SDneutral = 1.63), and those 
who received good news (Mgood = 7.51, SDgood = 1.57). All pairwise comparisons were 
significant at the p < .01 level (effect sizes: dbad vs. neutral = 0.65; dneutral vs. good = 0.66; dbad vs. good = 
1.20). 




Motives. Perceptions of the messenger’s motives differed by condition F(2, 301) = 11.23, 
p < .001, η2 = .07. Specifically, participants who received bad news (Mbad = 45.01, SDbad = 
21.86) were most likely to think that the messenger tried to draw the losing number relative to 
those who received neutral news (Mneutral = 52.64, SDneutral = 13.81), and those who received 
good news (Mgood = 55.95, SDgood = 13.30). Both of these pairwise comparisons were significant 
at the p < .01 level (effect sizes: dbad vs. neutral = 0.41; dbad vs. good = 0.60). Perceptions of motives 
were equivalent across the good and neutral conditions (p = .34, d = 0.24).  
To test whether perceptions of messenger motives were correlated with the effect, we 
used the bias-corrected bootstrap method recommended by Preacher and Hayes (2004), with the 
independent variable coded as 1 = bad news, and 0 = good or neutral news. The 95% confidence 
interval of the indirect mediation model did not contain zero [-.433, -.086], indicating that 
including perceptions of messenger motives as a mediational variable fits the data (Figure 3). 
In sum, Study 5A suggests that people dislike bad news messengers because they believe 
such messengers to have malevolent motives. By including a neutral condition, Study 5A 
additionally demonstrates that there is indeed a specific derogation of bearers of bad news, for 
they are liked less than bearers of neutral news. Interestingly, there also seems to be a likeability 
boost for messengers of good news, although perceptions of their motives are unaffected relative 
to the neutral news condition.  
 
Study 5B 
Study 5B provides evidence of mechanism specificity by testing whether the relationship 
between beliefs about the messenger’s motives and dislike of that messenger holds when 
controlling for an associative process measure. Study 5B uses a medical scenario as in Study 2A, 




in which participants imagined receiving either good news or bad news about their health. Prior 
to collecting the outcome measure (messenger likeability), we administered both an ascription of 
motives process measure as well as an associative process measure (c.f., Gawronski & Walther, 
2008; Payne, Cheng, Govorun, & Stewart, 2005).  
 
Method 
Pilot test. Given that a positive test result necessitates more doctor visits and treatment 
(i.e. more revenue for the doctor), participants, especially those in the bad news (i.e., positive test 
result) condition, may perceive the doctor messenger to have a conflict of interest, providing a 
valid reason for inferring the messenger to have malevolent motives. We therefore tested the 
stimuli to ensure that this was not the case. Participants (N = 101 MTurk workers, 57% male, 
Mage = 33.1 years, SD = 10.1) were presented with the same medical scenario as in the main 
study, in which they imagined receiving either bad versus good news. But instead of asking them 
to rate messenger likeability, we asked participants in the bad [good] news condition: “Do you 
think you are receiving this news because of a conflict of interest on Dr. Johnson's part (i.e. Do 
you think Dr. Johnson interpreted the result as being positive [negative] because he has a 
financial interest in you [not] having cancer, and not because you clearly [do not] have 
cancer)?,” using a 10-point response scale with endpoints labelled “No, definitely not” and “Yes, 
definitely.” Results indicated that even when asked directly in this manner, only seven (6.9%) of 
participants interpreted the news to be driven by a conflict of interest, and this perception did not 
differ between the good and bad news conditions (χ2 = 1.20, p = .44). 
In the main study, prospective participants (N = 605 MTurk workers) were first asked 
two screening questions: “Have you or an immediate family member of yours ever been 




diagnosed with cancer?” and “Are you familiar with Chinese language characters?” Those 
answering “No” to both of these questions (N = 200, 63% male, Mage = 34.2 years, SD = 10.0) 
proceeded to the study, in which, as in Study 2A, they imagined that they were receiving the 
results of a skin biopsy. To further reduce potential perceptions of a doctor conflict of interest, 
we conveyed the independence of the doctor from the test result by telling participants that: (1) 
the messenger doctor was a different doctor from the one who took the initial sample (implying 
that the doctor on call rotates and thus many not stand to benefit from additional visits) and (2) 
their sample was processed by an external medical lab. Participants were then shown a 
photograph of a doctor (Dr. Johnson), read an accompanying message from this messenger, that 
the biopsy either tested negative (good news condition) versus positive (bad news condition) for 
skin cancer. After receiving good or bad news, participants completed the two process measures 
(described below), the order of which was counterbalanced. 
Associative process measure. Our associative measure was based on the Affect 
Misattribution Procedure created by Payne et al. (2005) and used by others (e.g., Gawronski & 
Walther, 2008). Participants were told: 
This part of the study is about how people make simple but quick judgments. You’ll be shown 
pairs of pictures flashed one after the other. The first picture in each pair will be of a person or 
pattern. This is just a warning signal that the second picture, a Chinese character, is about to 
appear. The second picture in each pair will be the Chinese character. The Chinese character will 
disappear, and you will be asked to indicate, as quickly as you can, whether the character you just 
saw is more or less pleasant than the average Chinese character. 
Participants then completed 24 trials in which they first viewed a prime – either a photograph of 
Dr. Johnson or a neutral gray square for 100ms, followed by a blank screen for 130ms, and then 
a Chinese character pictograph for 150ms (see Payne et al., 2005). Next, the Chinese pictograph 




disappeared, and participants responded to the item: “Quick! Is the Chinese character you just 
saw more or less pleasant than the average Chinese character?” on a binary response scale (c.f., 
Payne et al., 2005): “less pleasant” or “more pleasant.” On a random selection of 12 of these 
trials, participants were primed with a photo of Dr. Johnson, and on the other 12 trials, they were 
primed with the neutral gray square. 
Motives process measure. Participants indicated their perceptions of the doctor’s 
motives by completing the statement “I think Dr. Johnson was...” using a sliding scale from 1 
(hoping for bad news) to 100 (hoping for good news), with the mid-point labelled “indifferent 
between bad vs good news.” 
Liking. Next, participants rated the statement “I like Dr. Johnson” on a scale from 1 
(strongly disagree) to 10 (strongly agree). 
Finally, participants completed an attention check in which they were tasked with 
identifying the test result from their scenario (98% passed), and then indicated whether they had 
ever been tested for cancer (18% had). 
Results 
Liking. Participants in the bad news condition liked the doctor significantly less than 
those in the good news condition (Mbad = 5.82, SDbad = 1.70; Mgood = 7.71, SDgood = 1.71), t(198) 
= 7.83, p < .001, d = 1.11, BF10 = 21444989635. 
Associative measure. Participants in the bad news condition rated the Chinese characters 
paired with the doctor’s photograph as significantly less pleasant (Mbad = 5.50, SDbad = 2.67) 
than those in the good news condition (Mgood = 6.98, SDgood = 1.95), t(198) = 4.49, p < .001, d = 
0.63, BF10 = 1388.99. In contrast, participants in the bad news condition did not rate the Chinese 
characters paired with the neutral squares as less pleasant (Mbad = 6.48, SDbad = 2.77) than those 




in the good news condition (Mgood = 6.83, SDgood = 2.35), t(198) = 0.97, p = .33, d = 0.14, BF01 = 
4.18. 
Motives measure. Participants in the bad news condition deemed the doctor to have 
significantly more malevolent motives than those in the good news condition (Mbad = 65.67, 
SDbad = 20.32; Mgood = 85.07, SDgood = 16.38), t(196) = 7.41, p < .001, d = 1.05, BF10 = 
1872791795. 
We tested whether the motives measure correlated with the effect, even when controlling 
for the associative measure. Using the bias-corrected bootstrap method recommended by 
Preacher and Hayes (2004), we found that the 95% confidence interval of the indirect mediation 
model of messenger motives did not contain zero [-.861, -.228], indicating that including 
perceptions of messenger motives as a mediational variable fits the data, even when controlling 
for the associative measure. 
In sum, Study 5B replicates Study 5A and also speaks to the plurality of mechanisms 
likely to underlie the effect. Specifically, Study 5B suggests that some of the effect may be 
accounted for by an associative process; however, additional variance appears to be accounted 
for by a novel, attributional account. Study 5A is also consistent with this account: consistent 
with associative processes, there is both a liking benefit bestowed on bearers of good news in 
addition to a liking penalty imposed on bearers of bad news (Carlston & Skowronski, 2005). 
However, in contrast to classic associative processes and consistent with attributional processes 
(Bohner et al., 1988; Jones & Davis, 1965; Kelley, 1973; Morewedge, 2009; Rozin & Royzman, 
2001), the ascription of motives reflects a valence asymmetry: it is only correlated with the 
derogation of bad news messengers (i.e., the negatively-valenced side of the effect) – but 
uncorrelated with the boost observed for bearers of good news. 






Our findings so far suggest that people dislike bearers of bad news. We contend that these 
judgments are unwarranted because the messenger neither had substantive control over the bad 
news’ occurrence (i.e., the draw was not rigged), nor did he choose to be a messenger – facts we 
attempted to convey credibly to participants. For example, Study 1 was run in sessions of up to 
36 participants in which it was transparent that some participants received good news while 
others received bad news. Thus participants likely (accurately) believed some of their peers to be 
receiving good news, and others to be receiving bad news, decreasing perceptions that the draw 
was rigged. And to convey that the messenger truly did not choose her fate, in Study 2B we 
explicitly conveyed that the messenger was assigned her role and administered a comprehension 
check to confirm that participants had noticed this information.  
However, even if participants believed that the draw was not rigged and the messenger 
assigned his role, disliking the bad news messenger could arguably be warranted if he was 
perceived as lacking empathy – a possibility given the minimalistic messenger scripts in the 
studies so far. This simplicity afforded clarity in demonstrating the basic effect, but it may have 
made the messenger seem lacking in empathy. Therefore in Study 5C, the messenger conveys: a) 
that she was assigned her role (consistent with Study 2B); and b) empathy, by apologizing when 
delivering the bad news (Brooks, Dai, & Schweitzer, 2014). 
Similarly, although in the studies so far the messenger truly did not have control over the 
occurrence of the undesired outcome – a fact we attempted to make transparent to participants – 
it is possible that participants nonetheless presumed the outcome to be rigged. Although this 
possibility seems less plausible in the medical scenario studies, Study 5C addresses it by having 




participants bet on an outcome determined by a publically verifiable, external event: whether the 
largest headline on a pre-specified page of tomorrow’s Wall Street Journal will have an even 
versus odd number of words. Thus, Study 5C was a 2-part study: on day one participants placed 
their bets; on day two they returned to hear the messenger convey the outcome. 
Method 
Day 1. Prospective participants (N = 389 MTurk workers) were asked whether anyone in 
their household subscribed to the print version of the Wall Street Journal. Those answering “No” 
(N = 301 MTurk workers; 47% male, Mage = 35.8 years, SD = 11.9) continued as participants, for 
which they would be paid $0.20 on day one, and $1.00 on day two (plus the possibility of a 
$0.50 bonus, as described next). Participants were endowed with an additional $0.50 and told 
that they would be using it in a bet. On the next page, participants saw a photo of the first author, 
plus a message from her. This feature was designed to make credible the messenger’s later claim 
that her boss assigned the task to her. The message read: 
Hi, I'm <first author name>, and I'm running this study. 
Across two HITs – one today, and one tomorrow – you will be betting this $0.50. 
You will be betting on whether the number of words in the title with the largest font size on page 
A2 of the print edition of tomorrow's Wall Street Journal is odd or even. That is, you will be 
betting on whether largest title on page A2 has an odd or an even number of words. Specifically, 
if… 
• You bet “odd” and you are correct – as in, the largest title on page A2 has an odd number 
of words, then you will win the $0.50 
• You bet “odd” and you are incorrect – as in, the largest title on page A2 has an even 
number of words, then you will lose the $0.50 




• You bet “even” and you are correct – as in, the largest title on page A2  has an even 
number of words, then you will win the $0.50 
• You bet “even" and you are incorrect – as in, the largest title on page A2 has an odd 
number of words, then you will lose the $0.50 
Tomorrow, you will be asked to complete part 2 of this study, during which I plan to tell you 
whether you won or lost the bet, and ask you to complete a short follow-up survey.  
Hyphenated words will be counted as one word.  
We also showed participants an example: a photograph of a prior day’s page A2 of the 
Wall Street Journal with the largest title circled. 
Prior to placing their bet, participants were required to correctly answer two quiz 
questions about the payment structure (Appendix E). 
Day 2. One day later, participants were invited to return; 90% (N = 270) did so (good 
news condition: 83%; bad news condition: 91%; χ2 = 3.83, p = .05). Participants first saw a 
message from the first author, along with her photo. The message read: 
“Welcome back. As a reminder, yesterday you participated in Part 1 of this study. You were 
given $0.50, and made a bet about whether the number of words in largest title on page A2 of 
today's Wall Street Journal would be odd or even. Your bet was that the title would contain an 
odd [even] number of words. If the title is actually an odd [even] number of words, you will win 
this additional $0.50 for a total study payment of $1.70.  If, instead the title is actually an even 
[odd] number of words, you will lose this $0.50 for a total study payment of $1.20. On the next 
page, you will learn the results.” 
Next, participants watched a video in which a research assistant, with that day’s Wall Street 
Journal in hand, said: 
“Hello, I’m [research assistant’s name], [first author’s name]’s research assistant. She was 
supposed to deliver this news, but ended up not being able to, so she assigned me to do it. Here is 




today’s Wall Street Journal. I’m turning to page A2 and finding the largest headline on the 
page…”  
The headline in question had an even number of words; therefore for participants who had bet on 
even, the messenger proceeded to say: 
“You chose even. I’m happy to tell you that I have good news for you. You won the lottery, and 
so you will receive the additional $0.50.” 
Conversely, for participants who had bet on odd, the messenger said: 
“You chose odd. I’m sorry to tell you that I have bad news for you. You lost the lottery, and I feel 
badly telling you this, but you lose the $0.50.”  
Finally, so that participants could see the headline for themselves, the research assistant held up 
page A2 of the Wall Street Journal and said: 
“The largest headline is ‘Revised GDP Signals 1.4% Growth Rate’. That’s six words, which is 
even.” 
The next screen displayed to participants what their total study payment would be (i.e., either 
$1.20 or $1.70). 
Participants then rated the statements: “I like the research assistant” on a scale from 1 
(strongly disagree) to 9 (strongly agree), and “I think the research assistant was...” using a 
sliding scale from 1 (hoping for bad news) to 100 (hoping for good news), with the mid-point 
labelled “indifferent between bad vs good news.” Administration order was counterbalanced 
between-subjects (order did not matter; we therefore collapse across it in the results). 
 Finally, participants completed an attention check in which they indicated 1) whether the 
researcher had chosen versus been assigned her role (90% passed), and 2) whether they had seen 
page A2 of that day’s Wall Street Journal prior to watching the video (99.6% – all but one 




participant – had not), and 3) indicated whether they experienced any technical difficulties (99% 
did not). 
Results 
Liking. Participants who received bad news liked the research assistant less than those 
who received good news (Mbad = 6.41, SDbad = 1.75; Mgood = 7.28, SDgood = 1.46), t(263) = 4.32, 
p < .001, d = 0.54, BF10 = 760.70. 
Motives. Participants who received bad news also deemed the research assistant’s 
motives to be more malevolent (Mbad = 41.55, SDbad = 19.76) than those who received good news 
(Mgood = 30.27, SDgood = 19.26), t(263) = 4.69, p < .001, d = 0.58, BF10 = 3385.41. 
To test whether the motives measure was correlated with the effect, we used the bias-
corrected bootstrap method recommended by Preacher and Hayes (2004). The 95% confidence 
interval of the indirect mediation model did not contain zero [-.725, -.266], indicating that 
including perceptions of messenger motives as a mediational variable fits the data. 
In sum, Study 5C provides converging evidence that people dislike messengers who 
deliver bad news and perceive such messengers to have malevolent motives. Study 5C also goes 
further, suggesting that such dislike surfaces even when a messenger who has clearly been 
assigned her role empathically conveys news of an unfortunate outcome that she could not 
plausibly have caused.  
Similarly, we ran an additional study (reported in full in Appendix F) within the medical 
scenario paradigm in which the messenger conveyed the news – regardless of whether it was 
good or bad – empathically. In the bad news condition, the physician messenger said: “I have 
bad news: your biopsy tested positive. This means that the mole is cancerous. I am so sorry. I 
feel for you. It must be difficult to be the recipient of this news.” Again, participants in the bad 




news condition liked the doctor less than those in the good news condition (Mbad = 5.73, SDbad = 
2.63; Mgood = 7.75, SDgood = 2.30), t(245) = 6.44, p < .001, d = 0.82, BF10 = 25015487.  
 
Studies 6A & 6B 
Ascription of Motives: Moderation 
Studies 5A-C showed that messenger dislike is linked to belief that the messenger has 
malevolent motives. This correlational approach provides preliminary, though equivocal, 
evidence of this element of our process account (Bullock, Green, & Ha, 2010; Fritz, Taylor, & 
MacKinnon, 2012; Spencer, Zanna, & Fong, 2005; Zhao, Lynch, & Chen, 2010). Studies 6A and 
6B go further, manipulating messenger motives independently from news valence to reveal a 
causal role in our process account. Specifically, these studies test whether the tendency to dislike 
bearers of bad news is mitigated when recipients are made aware of the benevolence of the 
messenger’s motives. Based on our account, we predicted that when a messenger with 
benevolent motives conveys bad news, the liking penalty would be reduced relative to the 
messenger with malevolent motives. Both studies use lottery paradigms as in Studies 1, 5A and 
5C, and apply 2 (News Valence: good vs. bad) x 2 (Messenger Motives: benevolent vs. 
malevolent) between-subjects designs. The two studies differ in the operationalization of the 
motives manipulation. Study 6A additionally demonstrates that the motives manipulation is 








Participants (N = 402 MTurk workers, 59% male, Mage = 34.5 years, SD = 10.4) were 
guaranteed a $0.60 payment and endowed with an additional $0.10 for a draw. Participants were 
told that they would watch a video in which a research assistant would draw a slip of paper that 
would determine whether they would keep the $0.10: 
The video will depict a researcher drawing one of two slips of paper from a bag at random. 
One of the slips of paper says “KEEP bonus.” If the researcher draws this slip, then you will keep 
the $0.10 bonus. The other slip of paper says “LOSE bonus.” If the researcher draws this slip, 
then you will lose the $0.10 bonus. 
Next, participants received information about the research assistant’s motives. They were 
randomized to either learn that the researcher was trying to draw the “lose bonus” slip 
(malevolent motives condition) or trying to draw the “keep bonus” slip (benevolent motives 
condition). 
 Participants next viewed a video in which the research assistant: (1) Showed that the 
opaque drawing jar was empty; (2) Wrote “LOSE bonus” on one slip of paper and “KEEP 
bonus” on another; (3) Put both slips into an opaque drawing jar; (4) Shook the jar; (5) Drew a 
slip from the jar while looking away; and (6) Opened the slip and read what it said. Specifically, 
based on the condition, the research assistant said: “I have been instructed to try and draw the 
keep [lose] bonus slip, here goes! I have good [bad] news for you. I succeeded [failed] in doing 
what I tried to do. I managed to [did not manage to] draw the keep [lose] bonus slip. This means 
that you keep [lose] your 10 cent bonus.” 
After watching the video, participants completed a manipulation check to ensure they had 
correctly interpreted the messenger’s motive. Participants were asked: “Which of the following 
is true?” and presented with each of the four possibilities of the statement “The drawer 




ACCOMPLISHED [FAILED at accomplishing] what she set out to do; to draw the “Keep 
$0.10” [“Lose $0.10”] slip.” Eighty-eight percent of participants passed this check. 
Next, participants rated the statements: “I like the drawer” and “I think the drawer is 
competent” on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 9 (strongly agree.) The order of these 
measures was counterbalanced (order did not matter; we therefore collapse across it in the 
results). 
Results 
Liking. Overall, bearers of bad news were liked less than bearers of good news, 
replicating our basic effect (Mbad = 5.52, SDbad = 2.21; Mgood = 7.33, SDgood = 1.61) F(1, 398) = 
92.92, p < .001, η2 = .18. Messengers with malevolent motives (Mmalevolent = 6.23, SDmalevolent = 
2.26) were also liked less than messengers with benevolent motives (Mbenevolent = 6.63, SDbenevolent 
= 1.97), F(1, 398) = 7.60, p = .006, η2 = .015. Importantly, these main effects were qualified by a 
significant News Valence x Messenger Motives interaction F(1, 398) = 5.99, p = .015, η2 = .012 
(Figure 4). Follow-up tests indicated that the motives manipulation served as a partial buffer: the 
benevolent bearer of bad news was liked more (Mbenevolent = 5.99, SDbenevolent = 2.04) than the 
malevolent bearer of bad news (Mmalevolent = 5.00, SDmalevolent = 2.29), t(198) = 3.24, p = .001, d = 
0.46, BF10 = 19.24—an effect that did not emerge in the good news conditions (Mbenevolent = 7.36, 
SDbenevolent = 1.61;  Mmalevolent = 7.30, SDmalevolent = 1.61), t(200) = 0.47, p = .80, d = 0.03, BF01 = 
5.87. 
Competence. In contrast to the results for liking, for competence, there was no News 
Valence x Messenger Motives interaction, F(1, 398) = 0.22, p = .64, η2 = .001, nor was there a 
main effect of motives (Mmalevolent = 7.04, SDmalevolent = 1.90; Mbenevolent = 6.99, SDbenevolent = 1.91) 
F(1, 398) = 0.002, p = .96, η2 < .01. There was, however, a main effect of news valence on 




competence ratings (Mbad = 6.57, SDbad = 2.07; Mgood = 7.46, SDgood = 1.62), F(1, 398) = 22.66, p 
< .001, η2 = .05. This supports our contention that innocent bearers of bad news could be the 
targets of other unwarrantedly negative judgments. However, competence was not moderated by 
our motive manipulation, suggesting that that this effect is driven by different mechanism(s). 
 
Study 6B 
Study 6B also provides evidence of moderation, but using a motives manipulation 
different than that of Study 6A. In Study 6B, the messenger could win a bonus contingent on 
whether the participant received good versus bad news. We manipulated whether the 
messenger’s bonus was aligned or misaligned with that of the recipient. Specifically, in the 
benevolent motives condition, the messenger earned a bonus when the participant received good 
news, and lost the bonus opportunity when the participant received bad news; in the malevolent 
motives condition the messenger earned a bonus when the participant received bad news, and 
lost the bonus opportunity when the participant received good news. The logic of this 
manipulation is that when incentives are misaligned, it is more plausible that the messenger has 
malevolent motives. Importantly however, because the messenger cannot actually control the 
outcome, motives are objectively irrelevant. Nonetheless, as our account predicts, this 
manipulation should moderate the effect, with messengers of bad news who have benevolent 
motives being liked more than those with malevolent motives. 
Method 
Participants (N = 600 MTurk workers, 60% male, Mage = 34.7 years, SD = 11.1) were 
guaranteed a $0.40 payment and endowed with an additional $0.10 for a draw. Next, they were 
told that they would be asked to select either the number one or the number two, and that 




afterward, they would watch a video of a research assistant reading from a slip of paper inside an 
envelope he had been given with the number one or two inside. Further, participants were told 
that if their selected number was inside, they would earn an additional $0.10 (good news 
condition), and that if the other number was inside, they would lose the $0.10 (bad news 
condition).  
Next came the motives manipulation: half of participants were told the pay-offs for the 
research assistant were identical to theirs; the other half were told that the payoffs for the 
research assistant were opposite theirs, such that the research assistant would gain $0.10 when 
the participant lost $0.10, and vice versa. Participants were then shown a table indicating exactly 
what the payoff would be for each of the four possible combinations of participant-selected 
versus read numbers (Appendix G). Prior to selecting a number, participants were required to 
correctly answer two quiz questions about the payment structure (Appendix H). 
After selecting the number one or two, participants were shown a prerecorded video, 
customized based on their motive condition and initial number selection (such that we created 
eight videos). In the video, a research assistant was shown with an envelope and said: “This is 
the envelope I’ve been given to open for this study.” Then, the research assistant opened the 
envelope and looked at the slip of paper, but did not show it to the camera, and said: 
“I have good [bad] news for you.  The number in the envelope is a 1 [2].  This means you will 
win an additional [lose the] $0.10, and I will also win [lose] $0.10 [I will lose [win] $0.10].” 
Then, the research assistant showed the slip of paper with the relevant number written on it. 
Next, participants responded to the item: “The researcher who read the number in the envelope is 
likeable,” on a scale from 1 (Not at all) to 10 (Extremely). Finally, participants completed two 
comprehension checks in which they indicated: 1) whether they had received good or bad news 




(i.e. whether they received the bonus; 97% passed) and 2) whether the research assistant received 
the bonus (95% passed). 
 
Results 
Liking. Overall, bearers of bad news were deemed less likeable relative to bearers of 
good news (Mbad = 5.37, SDbad = 2.17; Mgood = 7.24, SDgood = 1.80), F(1, 596) = 132.00, p < .001, 
η2 = .18. Messengers with malevolent motives (Mmalevolent = 6.37, SDmalevolent = 2.29) were not 
judged as any less likeable than messengers with benevolent motives (Mbenevolent = 6.25, 
SDbenevolent = 2.10), F(1, 596) = 0.16, p = .688, η2 < .01. These effects were qualified by a 
significant News Valence x Messenger Motives interaction, F(1, 596) = 7.39, p = .007, η2 = .01. 
Follow-up tests indicated that the motives manipulation served as a partial buffer: the benevolent 
bearer of bad news (benevolent because his incentives were aligned with the participant’s) was 
deemed more likeable (Mbenevolent = 5.60, SDbenevolent = 2.10) than the malevolent bearer of bad 
news (Mmalevolent = 5.10, SDmalevolent = 2.22), t(297) = 2.02, p = .044, d = 0.23, BF01 = 1.13. This 
was a slightly larger effect than that observed for those received good news (within good news 
conditions: Mmalevolent = 7.41, SDmalevolent = 1.75; Mbenevolent = 7.03, SDbenevolent = 1.83), t(299) = 
1.82, p = .07, d = 0.21, BF01 = 1.62. 
Although the size of the effect observed in Study 6B is small, taken together, Studies 6A 
and 6B provide converging evidence, via moderation, of our motives-based process account for 
the tendency to dislike bearers of bad news. In support of this account, these studies show that 
the tendency to dislike bearers of bad news is mitigated when messengers are aware of the 
benevolence of the messenger’s motives. 
 





Eleven experiments provide evidence that people have a tendency to ‘shoot the 
messenger,’ deeming innocent bearers of bad news unlikeable. Study 1 was a pre-registered lab 
experiment in which participants rated messengers who delivered bad news from a random 
drawing as relatively unlikeable. A second set of studies pointed to the specificity of the effect: 
Study 2A showed that it is unique to the messenger, and not mere bystanders. Study 2B showed 
that it is distinct from merely receiving information that one disagrees with.  
We have suggested that this effect – the tendency to deem bearers of bad news as 
unlikeable – stems in part from people’s desire to understand and make sense of chance 
processes. Consistent with this account, first, we showed that recipients of bad news exhibit a 
heightened desire to sense-make (Study 3A), and that manipulations designed to augment the 
desire to sense-make heighten the tendency to derogate bearers of bad news (Studies 3B and 4). 
Second, consistent with the idea that people fulfill this desire to sense-make by erroneously 
ascribing agency to innocent bearers of bad news, we showed that recipients of bad news tend to 
believe their messengers have malevolent motives – a tendency we link to messenger dislike 
(Studies 5A, 5B, 5C, 6A, and 6B).  
We have shown that people judge innocent messengers of bad news as unlikeable – and 
that because the messengers are innocent, in the sense that they did not choose their fate and 
could not control the outcome, these harsh judgments are unwarranted. This effect may render 
justifiable a related phenomenon – the mum effect, whereby people avoid conveying bad news 
when given the choice (Rosen & Tesser, 1970). Importantly, our studies are reflective of many 
real-life situations, including medical contexts, in which people, through no fault of their own, 
are tasked with the unfortunate role of communicating unwanted news. Through demonstrating 




the effect in contextually rich scenario studies, in addition to abstract lottery paradigms, we 
suggest these erroneous judgments are common in everyday life. However, there are also 
situations in which derogation of bad news messengers could be justified. For example, a repair 
technician may relish in informing a customer of worse-than-anticipated damage because of the 
increased business it would afford. In such cases, we would expect such actors to be even more 
strongly disliked than the innocent messengers of our studies. 
We focused on likeability as dislike has been found to dominate judgments of other 
attributes (e.g., competence) that drive people’s behavior towards a target (Casciaro & Lobo, 
2008). However, bad news messengers could be the targets of other unwarrantedly negative 
judgments; as shown in Study 6A, they are deemed less competent than bearers of good news. 
Future research might investigate this finding, and more broadly, delve into the unique 
psychological mechanisms underlying the additional consequences of being a messenger. Future 
research might also explore interventions, to address for example, how physicians might deliver 
unwelcome news without suffering a likeability penalty. Studies 6A and 6B provide a starting 
point, suggesting that it may behoove physicians to explicitly state what they probably presume 
is a given: that they wish the best for their patients. 
We provide evidence that our effect is undergirded in part by a motivation to make sense 
of unwanted outcomes, even those arising from chance. However, we readily acknowledge that 
the effect is likely multiply determined; indeed, Study 5B suggests that associative processes 
may also play a role. Further, although bad news heightens the desire to sense-make (Study 3A), 
and heightening the desire to sense-make augments messenger dislike (Study 3B), other 
unmeasured, complementary processes could also contribute to people’s tendencies to ‘shoot the 
messenger.’ Similarly, although Studies 5A-C demonstrate that a model assessing messenger 




motives as a mediational variable fits the data, it is possible that other, unmeasured models may 
fit our data just as well if not better (Murphy & Zajonc, 1993; Reeder, Vonk, Ronk, Ham, & 
Lawrence, 2004; Zajonc, 1980). These correlational studies are consistent with our process 
account but are particularly subject to alternative causal explanations. However, Studies 4, 6A, 
and 6B – which offer support for our process account via experimental methods (by 
demonstrating that our effect is moderated by manipulating the process variable) – are less 
subject to alternative causal explanations. Considering the evidence as a whole, motivational 
inferences are likely a driver of the relationship between bad news delivery and messenger 
liking. Future research is needed to assess possible additional mechanisms.  
From an academic perspective, this research advances theories of judgment and decision 
making, the psychology of meaning-making, and the literature on feedback and communication. 
In the spirit of the field of judgment and decision-making, we document a novel judgmental 
mistake, in this case in person-perception during interpersonal communication processes: people 
erroneously ascribe malevolent motives to the innocent messengers who inform them of 
unfortunate outcomes. We also provide empirical evidence consistent with sense-making models 
of human behavior – evidence that a comprehensive review of the broader meaning-making 
literature (Park, 2010) concluded to be scant, noting that “unfortunately, empirical work has not 
matched the richness or complexity of theories regarding meaning and meaning making, perhaps 
partly because the abstract and complex nature of the theoretical models renders them more 
amenable to hypothesis generation than to hypothesis testing” (p. 262). 
From a practical standpoint, our findings imply a kind of “triple whammy” for those 
delivering and receiving bad news. First, those given the difficult but important task of breaking 
bad news are deemed unlikeable, a stressor unto itself. Second, recipients must grapple with a 




new and undesired state of the world. Third, because people are loath to accept advice from those 
they dislike (Feng & MacGeorge, 2010; Silvia, 2005), recipients may be disinclined to recognize 
messengers as a resource. Especially when the messenger is integral to the solution, as is often 
the case in medical contexts, this means that ‘shooting the messenger’ can impede people from 
taking steps to brighten their futures.  
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Error bars represent +/- 1 SE of the mean. 





















Error bars represent +/- 1 SE of the mean. 
Figure 2. News recipients are particularly likely to derogate bearers of bad news when that bad 
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Figure 3. Including messenger motives as a mediational variable fits the data (Study 5A).  
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Study 2B Pro/Anti Marijuana Statements 
Pro Marijuana:  
Marijuana has accepted medical use in treatment in the US, and it would easily meet the FDA 
criteria over whether a new product's benefits to users will outweigh its risks. Marijuana is a safe 
and effective treatment for dozens of conditions, such as cancer, AIDS, multiple sclerosis, pain, 
migraines, glaucoma, and epilepsy. Thousands of yearly deaths from legal prescription drugs 
could be prevented if medical marijuana were legal. 
 
Anti Marijuana:  
Marijuana has not been FDA-approved because it is too dangerous to use, and various FDA-
approved drugs make the use of marijuana unnecessary. Marijuana is addictive, leads to harder 
drug use, injures the lungs, harms the immune system, damages the brain, interferes with 
fertility, impairs driving ability, and sends the wrong message to kids. Medical marijuana is a 
front for drug legalization, and that people who claim medical use are actually using it for 
recreational pleasure. 
 
Source: Procon.org “a nonpartisan nonprofit organization with a mission of ‘Promoting critical 
thinking, education, and informed citizenship by presenting controversial issues in a 










We ran an additional study to assess whether receiving bad news prompted more sense-
making using the plane boarding paradigm. 
Method 
Participants (N = 202 MTurk workers; 46% male, Mage = 37.80 years, SD =11.59) were 
asked to imagine a plane-boarding scenario as in Study 3A, whereby they were “at the airport, 
sitting at gate B5, which is the gate for your flight.” Participants in the bad news condition were 
told:  
The gate agent makes the following announcement: This is an announcement that this flight is 
delayed by two hours: your flight will depart two hours later than scheduled. 
Participants in the control condition were told:  
This is an announcement that this flight will be boarding soon: your flight will start boarding in 
five minutes. 
 Next, we measured sense-making by asking participants to rate the statement: “I’m trying 
to make sense of this news” on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) (c.f., 
Bonanno, Wortman, & Nesse, 2004; Eton, Lepore, & Helgeson, 2005; Kernan & Lepore, 2009; 
Tomich & Helgeson, 2002; Updegraff, Silver, & Holman, 2008). Finally, participants completed 
a multiple choice comprehension check in which they identified what the gate agent had 
announced (94.4% passed). Participants also indicated whether they had flown on a commercial 
airplane (93.6% had). 
Results 
Sense-making. Replicating our results from Study 3A, participants in the bad news 
condition were more likely to indicate that they were trying to make sense of the news relative to 
those in the control condition (Mbad = 4.16, SDbad = 1.11; Mcontrol = 4.80, SDcontrol = .97), t(200) = 
4.38, p < .001, d = 0.61. 
  





Study 5A Lottery Payout Table 
 
  




Appendix D  
Study 5A Quiz Questions (correct answers bolded) 
 
Suppose you chose the number 2 and the number drawn was also a 2, what would 
your total payment for this HIT be? ($0.90, $1.00, $1.10, $1.20, $1.30) 
 
Suppose you chose the number 1 and the number drawn was a 2, what would your 
total payment for this HIT be? ($0.90, $1.00, $1.10, $1.20, $1.30) 
 
Suppose you chose the number 3 and the number drawn was a 2, what would your 
total payment for this HIT be? ($0.90, $1.00, $1.10, $1.20, $1.30) 
 
  





Study 5C Quiz Questions (correct answers bolded) 
If today you bet “even,” and tomorrow the largest title on page A2 of the Wall 
Street Journal is “Police Investigating Homicides of Doctors,” what will your total 
study payment be? ($1.20, $1.50, $1.70) 
 
If you bet “odd,” and tomorrow the largest title on page A2 of the Wall Street 
Journal is “State-of-the-art building unveiled” what will your total study payment 
be? ($1.20, $1.50, $1.70) 
 
  




Appendix F  
We ran an additional study within the medical scenario paradigm in which the messenger 
conveyed the news – regardless of whether it was good or bad – empathically. The study was a 2 
condition between-subjects design manipulating news valence (bad vs. good). 
Method 
Prospective participants (N = 611 MTurk workers) were first asked “Have you or an 
immediate family member of yours ever been diagnosed with cancer?” those answering “Yes” 
were screened out per IRB requirement. Those answering “No” (N = 256) imagined themselves 
as patients attending a medical appointment to learn whether a recent biopsy had tested positive 
for skin cancer, as in Studies 2A and 3B. Nine participants failed to complete the survey 
resulting in a final sample of N = 247 (55% male, Mage = 33.5 years, SD = 9.6). Between-
subjects, we manipulated whether participants received bad versus good news; in both cases, we 
incorporated empathy into the messenger’s script. Specifically, in the bad news condition, 
participants were told: 
Your doctor, Dr. Johnson, tells you: “I have bad news: your biopsy tested positive. This means 
that the mole is cancerous. I am so sorry. I feel for you. It must be difficult to be the recipient of 
this news.” 
In the good news condition, participants were told: 
Your doctor, Dr. Johnson, tells you: “I have good news: your biopsy tested negative. This means 
that the mole is NOT cancerous. I am so glad. I feel happy for you. It must be great to be the 
recipient of this news.” 
Next, participants rated the how much they liked the doctor and their perception of his 
motives using the same items as Study 3B.  
Finally, participants completed an attention check in which they were tasked with 
identifying the test result from their scenario (97% passed), then indicated whether they had ever 
been tested for cancer (23% had), and completed some basic demographic information. 
Results 
Liking. Participants in the bad news condition liked the doctor less than those in the good 
news condition (Mbad = 5.73, SDbad = 2.63; Mgood = 7.75, SDgood = 2.30), t(245) = 6.44, p < .001, 
d = 0.82, BF10 = 25015487. 
Motives. Participants in the bad news condition also deemed the doctor’s motives to be 
more malevolent (Mbad = 78.98, SDbad = 21.91) than those in the good news condition (Mgood = 
84.50, SDgood = 18.45), t(245) = 2.14, p =.033, d = 0.27. The 95% confidence interval of the 
indirect mediation model did not contain zero [-.454, -.020], indicating that including perceptions 
of messenger motives as a mediational variable fits the data. 
 
  














1 1 Win (you receive an additional $0.10) Win (researcher receives an additional $0.10) $0.60
1 2 Lose (you lose $0.10) Lose (researcher loses $0.10) $0.40
2 1 Lose (you lose $0.10) Lose (researcher loses $0.10) $0.40
2 2 Win (you receive an additional $0.10) Win (researcher receives an additional $0.10) $0.60













1 1 Win (you receive an additional $0.10) Lose (researcher loses $0.10) $0.60
1 2 Lose (you lose $0.10) Win (researcher receives an additional $0.10) $0.40
2 1 Lose (you lose $0.10) Win (researcher receives an additional $0.10) $0.40
2 2 Win (you receive an additional $0.10) Lose (researcher loses $0.10) $0.60





Study 6B Quiz Questions (aligned condition correct answers bolded, misaligned condition 
correct answers italicized) 
 
Suppose you pick 2 and the number in the envelope the researcher reads is also 2, what would 
the payouts be? (You win $0.10, researcher wins $0.10; You win $0.10, researcher loses $0.10; 
You lose $0.10, researcher wins $0.10) 
 
Suppose you pick 2 and the number in the envelope the researcher reads is 1, what would the 
payouts be? (You win $0.10, researcher wins $0.10; You lose $0.10, researcher loses $0.10; 
You lose $0.10, researcher wins $0.10) 
 
 
